]> SandboxAQ

durumcrustulum@gmail.com

Crypto Forum This document defines generic techniques to achive hybrid post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) from post-quantum and traditional component algorithms that meet specified security properties. It then uses those generic techniques to construct several concrete instances of hybrid KEMs. Discussion Venues Discussion of this document takes place on the Crypto Forum Research Group mailing list (cfrg@ietf.org), which is archived at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction

Motivation There are many choices that can be made when specifying a hybrid KEM: the constituent KEMs; their security levels; the combiner; and the hash within, to name but a few. Having too many similar options are a burden to the ecosystem. The aim of this document is provide a small set of techniques for constructing hybrid KEMs designed to achieve specific security properties given conforming component algorithms, that should be suitable for the vast majority of use cases.

Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Notation This document is consistent with all terminology defined in . The following terms are used throughout this document:

• random(n): return a pseudorandom byte string of length n bytes produced by a cryptographically-secure random number generator.
• concat(x0, ..., xN): Concatenation of byte strings. concat(0x01, 0x0203, 0x040506) = 0x010203040506.
• I2OSP(n, w): Convert non-negative integer n to a w-length, big-endian byte string, as described in .
• OS2IP(x): Convert byte string x to a non-negative integer, as described in , assuming big-endian byte order.

Key encapsulation mechanisms Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) are cryptographic schemes that consist of three algorithms:

• KeyGen() -> (pk, sk): A probabilistic key generation algorithm, which generates a public encapsulation key pk and a secret decapsulation key sk.
• Encaps(pk) -> (ct, shared_secret): A probabilistic encapsulation algorithm, which takes as input a public encapsulation key pk and outputs a ciphertext ct and shared secret shared_secret.
• Decaps(sk, ct) -> shared_secret: A decapsulation algorithm, which takes as input a secret decapsulation key sk and ciphertext ct and outputs a shared secret shared_secret.

Hybrid KEM Security Properties Hybrid KEM constructions aim to provide security by combining two or more schemes so that security is preserved if all but one schemes are replaced by an arbitrarily bad scheme.

Hybrid Security Informally, hybrid KEMs are secure if the KDF is secure, and if any one of the components KEMs is secure: this is the 'hybrid' property.

IND-CCA security Also known as IND-CCA2 security for general public key encryption, for KEMs that encapsulate a new random 'message' each time. The notion of INDistinguishability against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (IND-CCA) [RS92] is now widely accepted as the standard security notion for asymmetric encryption schemes. IND-CCA security requires that no efficient adversary can recognize which of two messages is encrypted in a given ciphertext, even if the two candidate messages are chosen by the adversary himself.

Ciphertext second preimage resistant (C2PRI) security / ciphertext collision resistance (CCR) The notion where, even if a KEM has broken IND-CCA security (either due to construction, implementation, or other), its internal structure, based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform, guarantees that it is impossible to find a second ciphertext that decapsulates to the same shared secret K: this notion is known as ciphertext second preimage resistance (C2SPI) for KEMs . The same notion has also been described as chosen ciphertext resistance elsewhere .

Binding properties

X-BIND-K-PK security

X-BIND-K-CT security Ciphertext second preimage resistance for KEMs ([C2PRI]). Related to the ciphertext collision-freeness of the underlying PKE scheme of a FO-transform KEM. Also called ciphertext collision resistance.

Cryptographic Dependencies The generic hybrid PQ/T KEM constructions we define depend on the the following cryptographic primitives:

• Extendable Output Function
• Key Derivation Function
• Post-Quantum-secure KEM
• Nominal Diffie-Hellman Group

XOF Extendable-output function (XOF). A function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any desired length. Ought to satisfy the following properties as long as the specified output length is sufficiently long to prevent trivial attacks:

1. (One-way) It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any new pre-specified output.
2. (Collision-resistant) It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to the same output.

MUST provide the bit-security required to source input randomness for PQ/T components from a seed that is expanded to a output length, of which a subset is passed to the component key generation algorithms.

Key Derivation Function KDF A secure key derivation function (KDF) that is modeled as a secure pseudorandom function (PRF) in the standard model and independent random oracle in the random oracle model (ROM).

Post-Quantum KEM An IND-CCA KEM that is resilient against post-quantum attacks. It fulfills the scheme API in {kems}.

Post-quantum KEM ciphertext pq_CT The ciphertext produced from one encapsulation from the post-quantum component KEM.

Post-quantum KEM public encapsulation key pq_PK The public encapsulation key produced by one key generation from the post-quantum component KEM.

Post-quantum KEM shared secret pq_SS The shared secret produced from one encapsulation/decapsulation from the post-quantum component KEM.

Traditional KEM ciphertext trad_CT The ciphertext (or equivalent) produced from one encapsulation from the traditional component KEM. For the constructions in this document, this is a Diffie-Hellman group element.

Traditional KEM public encapsulation key trad_PK The public encapsulation key produced by one key generation from the traditional component KEM. For the constructions in this document, this is a Diffie-Hellman group element.

Traditional KEM shared secret trad_SS The shared secret produced from one encapsulation/decapsulation from the traditional component KEM. For the constructions in this document, this is a Diffie-Hellman group element.

Nominal Diffie-Hellman Group The traditional DH-KEM construction depends on an abelian group of order order. We represent this group as the object G that additionally defines helper functions described below. The group operation for G is addition + with identity element I. For any elements A and B of the group G, A + B = B + A is also a member of G. Also, for any A in G, there exists an element -A such that A + (-A) = (-A) + A = I. For convenience, we use - to denote subtraction, e.g., A - B = A + (-B). Integers, taken modulo the group order order, are called scalars; arithmetic operations on scalars are implicitly performed modulo order. Scalar multiplication is equivalent to the repeated application of the group operation on an element A with itself r-1 times, denoted as ScalarMult(A, r). We denote the sum, difference, and product of two scalars using the +, -, and * operators, respectively. (Note that this means + may refer to group element addition or scalar addition, depending on the type of the operands.) For any element A, ScalarMult(A, order) = I. We denote B as a fixed generator of the group. Scalar base multiplication is equivalent to the repeated application of the group operation on B with itself r-1 times, this is denoted as ScalarBaseMult(r). The set of scalars corresponds to GF(order), which we refer to as the scalar field. It is assumed that group element addition, negation, and equality comparison can be efficiently computed for arbitrary group elements. This document uses types Element and Scalar to denote elements of the group G and its set of scalars, respectively. We denote Scalar(x) as the conversion of integer input x to the corresponding Scalar value with the same numeric value. For example, Scalar(1) yields a Scalar representing the value 1. We denote equality comparison of these types as == and assignment of values by =. When comparing Scalar values, e.g., for the purposes of sorting lists of Scalar values, the least nonnegative representation mod order is used. We now detail a number of member functions that can be invoked on G.

• Order(): Outputs the order of G (i.e., order).
• Identity(): Outputs the identity Element of the group (i.e., I).
• RandomScalar(): Outputs a random Scalar element in GF(order), i.e., a random scalar in [0, order - 1].
• ScalarMult(A, k): Outputs the scalar multiplication between Element A and Scalar k.
• ScalarBaseMult(k): Outputs the scalar multiplication between Scalar k and the group generator B.
• SerializeElement(A): Maps an Element A to a canonical byte array buf of fixed length Ne. This function raises an error if A is the identity element of the group.
• DeserializeElement(buf): Attempts to map a byte array buf to an Element A, and fails if the input is not the valid canonical byte representation of an element of the group. This function raises an error if deserialization fails or if A is the identity element of the group.
• SerializeScalar(s): Maps a Scalar s to a canonical byte array buf of fixed length Ns.
• DeserializeScalar(buf): Attempts to map a byte array buf to a Scalar s. This function raises an error if deserialization fails.

Other

label ASCII-encoded bytes that provide oracle cloning in the security game via domain separation. The IND-CCA security of hybrid KEMs often relies on the KDF function KDF to behave as an independent random oracle, which the inclusion of the label achieves via domain separation . By design, the calls to KDF in these constructions and usage anywhere else in higher level protoocl use separate input domains unless intentionally duplicating the 'label' per concrete instance with fixed paramters. This justifies modeling them as independent functions even if instantiated by the same KDF. This domain separation is achieved by using prefix-free sets of label values. Recall that a set is prefix-free if no element is a prefix of another within the set. Length diffentiation is sometimes used to achieve domain separation but as a technique it is [brittle and prone to misuse] in practice so we favor the use of an explicit post-fix label.

Hybrid KEM Generic Constructions

Common security requirements

KDF as a secure PRF A key derivation function (KDF) that is modeled as a secure pseudorandom function (PRF) in the standard model and independent random oracle in the random oracle model (ROM).

IND-CCA-secure Post-Quantum KEM A component post-quantum KEM that has IND-CCA security.

IND-CCA-secure traditional KEM A component traditional KEM that has IND-CCA security.

Fixed lengths Every instantiation in concrete parameters of the generic constructions is for fixed parameter sizes, KDF choice, and label, allowing the lengths to not also be encoded into the generic construction. The label/KDF/component algorithm parameter sets MUST be disjoint and non-colliding. This document assumes and requires that the length of each public key, ciphertext, and shared secret is fixed once the algorithm is fixed in the concrete instantiations. This is the case for all concrete instantiations in this document.

Key Generation We specify a common generic key generation scheme for all generic constructions. This requires the component key generation algorithns to accept the sufficient random seed, possibly according to their parameter set. ### Key derivation {#derive-key-pair}

'Kitchen Sink' construction: As indicated by the name, the KitchenSink construction puts 'the whole transcript' through the KDF. This relies on the minimum security properties of its component algorithms at the cost of more bytes needing to be processed by the KDF.

Security properties Because the entire hybrid KEM ciphertext and encapsulation key material are included in the KDF preimage, the KitchenSink construction is resilient against implementation errors in the component algorithms.

'QSF' construction Inspired by the generic QSF (Quantum Superiority Fighter) framework in , which leverages the security properties of a KEM like ML-KEM and an inlined instance of DH-KEM, to elide other public data like the PQ ciphertext and encapsulation key from the KDF input:

Requirements

Nominal Diffie-Hellman Group with strong Diffie-Hellman security A cryptographic group modelable as a nominal group where the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds {XWING}. Specically regarding a nominal group, this means that especially the QSF construction's security is based on a computational-Diffie-Hellman-like problem, but no assumption is made about the format of the generated group element - no assumption is made that the shared group element is indistinguishable from random bytes. The concrete instantiations in this document use elliptic curve groups that have been modeled as nominal groups in the literature.

Post-quantum IND-CCA KEM with ciphertext second preimage resistance The QSF relies the post-quantum KEM component having IND-CCA security against a post-quantum attacker, and ciphertext second preimage resistance (C2SPI, also known as chosen ciphertext resistance, CCR). C2SPI/CCR is equivalent to LEAK-BIND-K,PK-CT security

KDF is a secure (post-quantum) PRF, modelable as a random oracle Indistinguishability of the final shared secret from a random key is established by modeling the key-derivation function as a random oracle .

Concrete Hybrid KEM Instances

QSF-SHA3-256-ML-KEM-768-P-256 Also known as but with P-256 instead of X25519.

• label: QSF-SHA3-256-ML-KEM-768-P-256
• XOF: [SHAKE-256][FIPS202]
• KDF: [SHA3-256][FIPS202]
• PQ KEM: ML-KEM-768
• Group: [P-256] (secp256r1) , where Ne = 33 and Ns = 32.

This instantiation uses P-256 for the Group.

• Group: P-256
  • Order(): Return 0xffffffff00000000ffffffffffffffffbce6faada7179e84f3b9cac2fc632551.
  • Identity(): As defined in .
  • RandomScalar(): Implemented by returning a uniformly random Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1]. Refer to for implementation guidance.
  • SerializeElement(A): Implemented using the compressed Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String method according to , yielding a 33-byte output. Additionally, this function validates that the input element is not the group identity element.
  • DeserializeElement(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a 33-byte input string to a public key using the compressed Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point method according to , and then performs public-key validation as defined in section 3.2.2.1 of . This includes checking that the coordinates of the resulting point are in the correct range, that the point is on the curve, and that the point is not the point at infinity. (As noted in the specification, validation of the point order is not required since the cofactor is 1.) If any of these checks fail, deserialization returns an error.
  • SerializeScalar(s): Implemented using the Field-Element-to-Octet-String conversion according to .
  • DeserializeScalar(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a Scalar from a 32-byte string using Octet-String-to-Field-Element from . This function can fail if the input does not represent a Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1].

Key generation A keypair (decapsulation key, encapsulation key) is generated as follows. GenerateKeyPair() returns the 32 byte secret decapsulation key sk and the 1217 byte encapsulation key pk. For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of key generation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized variant of key generation. sk MUST be 32 bytes. GenerateKeyPairDerand() returns the 32 byte secret decapsulation key sk and the 1217 byte encapsulation key pk.

Shared secret Given 32-byte strings ss_M, ss_G, and the 33-byte strings ct_G, pk_G, representing the ML-KEM-768 shared secret, P-256 shared secret, P-256 ciphertext (ephemeral public key) and P-256 public key respectively, the 32 byte combined shared secret is given by: where label is the instance label. In hex label is given by TODO.

Encapsulation Given an encapsulation key pk, encapsulation proceeds as follows. pk is a 1217 byte X-Wing encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() Encapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1121 byte ciphertext ct. Note that Encapsulate() may raise an error if the ML-KEM encapsulation does not pass the check of §7.2.

Derandomized For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of encapsulation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized function. pk is a 1217 byte X-Wing encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() eseed MUST be 65 bytes. EncapsulateDerand() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1121 byte ciphertext ct.

Decapsulation ct is the 1121 byte ciphertext resulting from Encapsulate() sk is a 32 byte decapsulation key resulting from GenerateKeyPair() Decapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret.

Security properties

Binding The inlined DH-KEM is instantiated over the elliptic curve group P-256: as shown in , this gives the traditional KEM maximum binding properties (MAL-BIND-K-CT, MAL-BIND-K-PK). ML-KEM-768 as standardized in , when using the 64-byte seed key format as is here, provides MAL-BIND-K-CT security and LEAK-BIND-K-PK security, as demonstrated in . Therefore this concrete instance provides MAL-BIND-K-PK and MAL-BIND-K-CT security. This implies via that this instance also satisfies

• MAL-BIND-K,CT-PK
• MAL-BIND-K,PK-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K,CT-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K,PK-CT
• HON-BIND-K-PK
• HON-BIND-K-CT
• HON-BIND-K,CT-PK
• HON-BIND-K,PK-CT

KitchenSink-HKDF-SHA-256-ML-KEM-768-X25519

• label: KitchenSink-HKDF-SHA-256-ML-KEM-768-X25519
• XOF: [SHAKE-256][FIPS202]
• KDF: HKDF-SHA-256

HKDF is comprised of HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand. We compose them as one function here:

• PQ KEM: ML-KEM-768
• Group: X25519

This instantiation uses X25519 for the Group.

• Group: Curve25519 , where Ne = 32 and Ns = 32.
  • Order(): Return 2^252 + 0x14def9dea2f79cd65812631a5cf5d3ed (see ).
  • Identity(): As defined in .
  • RandomScalar(): Implemented by returning a uniformly random Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1]. Refer to for implementation guidance.
  • SerializeElement(A): Implemented as specified in .
  • DeserializeElement(buf): Implemented as specified in .
  • SerializeScalar(s): Implemented by outputting the little-endian 32-byte encoding of the Scalar value with the top three bits set to zero.
  • DeserializeScalar(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a Scalar from a little-endian 32-byte string. This function can fail if the input does not represent a Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1]. Note that this means the top three bits of the input MUST be zero.

Key generation A keypair (decapsulation key, encapsulation key) is generated as follows. GenerateKeyPair() returns the 32 byte secret decapsulation key sk and the 1216 byte encapsulation key pk. For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of key generation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized variant of key generation. sk MUST be 32 bytes. GenerateKeyPairDerand() returns the 32 byte secret encapsulation key sk and the 1216 byte decapsulation key pk.

Shared secret Given 32-byte strings ss_M, ss_G, ct_G, pk_G, representing the ML-KEM-768 shared secret, X25519 shared secret, X25519 ciphertext (ephemeral public key) and X25519 public key respectively, the 32 byte combined shared secret is given by: where label is the instance label. In hex label is given by TODO.

Encapsulation Given an encapsulation key pk, encapsulation proceeds as follows. pk is a 1216 byte encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() Encapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1120 byte ciphertext ct. Note that Encapsulate() may raise an error if the ML-KEM encapsulation does not pass the check of §7.2.

Derandomized For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of encapsulation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized function. pk is a 1217 byte X-Wing encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() eseed MUST be 65 bytes. EncapsulateDerand() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1121 byte ciphertext ct.

Decapsulation ct is the 1120 byte ciphertext resulting from Encapsulate() sk is a 32 byte decapsulation key resulting from GenerateKeyPair() Decapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret.

Security properties

Binding The inlined DH-KEM instantiated over the elliptic curve group X25519: as shown in , this gives the traditional KEM maximum binding properties (MAL-BIND-K-CT, MAL-BIND-K-PK). ML-KEM-768 as standardized in , when using the 64-byte seed key format as is here, provides MAL-BIND-K-CT security and LEAK-BIND-K-PK security, as demonstrated in . Further, the ML-KEM ciphertext and encapsulation key are included in the KDF preimage, giving straightforward CT and PK binding for the entire bytes of the hybrid KEM ciphertext and encapsulation key. Therefore this concrete instance provides MAL-BIND-K-PK and MAL-BIND-K-CT security. This implies via that this instance also satisfies

• MAL-BIND-K,CT-PK
• MAL-BIND-K,PK-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K,CT-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K,PK-CT
• HON-BIND-K-PK
• HON-BIND-K-CT
• HON-BIND-K,CT-PK
• HON-BIND-K,PK-CT

QSF-SHA3-256-ML-KEM-1024-P-384

• label: QSF-SHA3-256-ML-KEM-768-P-256
• XOF: [SHAKE-256][FIPS202]
• KDF: [SHA3-256][FIPS202]
• PQ KEM: ML-KEM-1024
• Group: [P-384] (secp256r1) , where Ne = 33 and Ns = 32.

This instantiation uses P-384 for the Group.

• Group: P-384
  • Order(): Return 0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffc7634d81f4372ddf 581a0db248b0a77aecec196accc52973
  • Identity(): As defined in .
  • RandomScalar(): Implemented by returning a uniformly random Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1]. Refer to for implementation guidance.
  • SerializeElement(A): Implemented using the compressed Elliptic-Curve-Point-to-Octet-String method according to , yielding a 61-byte output. Additionally, this function validates that the input element is not the group identity element.
  • DeserializeElement(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a 61-byte input string to a public key using the compressed Octet-String-to-Elliptic-Curve-Point method according to , and then performs public-key validation as defined in section 3.2.2.1 of . This includes checking that the coordinates of the resulting point are in the correct range, that the point is on the curve, and that the point is not the point at infinity. (As noted in the specification, validation of the point order is not required since the cofactor is 1.) If any of these checks fail, deserialization returns an error.
  • SerializeScalar(s): Implemented using the Field-Element-to-Octet-String conversion according to .
  • DeserializeScalar(buf): Implemented by attempting to deserialize a Scalar from a 48-byte string using Octet-String-to-Field-Element from . This function can fail if the input does not represent a Scalar in the range [0, G.Order() - 1].

Key generation A keypair (decapsulation key, encapsulation key) is generated as follows. GenerateKeyPair() returns the 32 byte secret decapsulation key sk and the 1629 byte encapsulation key pk. For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of key generation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized variant of key generation. sk MUST be 32 bytes. GenerateKeyPairDerand() returns the 32 byte secret decapsulation key sk and the 1629 byte encapsulation key pk.

Shared secret Given 32-byte string ss_M, the 61-byte strings ss_G, ct_G, pk_G, representing the ML-KEM-1024 shared secret, P-384 shared secret, P-384 ciphertext (ephemeral public key) and P-384 public key respectively, the 32 byte combined shared secret is given by: where label is the instance label. In hex label is given by TODO.

Encapsulation Given an encapsulation key pk, encapsulation proceeds as follows. pk is a 1629 byte X-Wing encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() Encapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1629 byte ciphertext ct. Note that Encapsulate() may raise an error if the ML-KEM encapsulation does not pass the check of §7.2.

Derandomized For testing, it is convenient to have a deterministic version of encapsulation. An implementation MAY provide the following derandomized function. pk is a 1629 byte X-Wing encapsulation key resulting from GeneratePublicKey() eseed MUST be 80 bytes. EncapsulateDerand() returns the 32 byte shared secret ss and the 1629 byte ciphertext ct.

Decapsulation ct is the 1629 byte ciphertext resulting from Encapsulate() sk is a 32 byte decapsulation key resulting from GenerateKeyPair() Decapsulate() returns the 32 byte shared secret.

Security properties

Binding The inlined DH-KEM is instantiated over the elliptic curve group P-384: as shown in , this gives the traditional KEM maximum binding properties (MAL-BIND-K-CT, MAL-BIND-K-PK). ML-KEM-1024 as standardized in , when using the 64-byte seed key format as is here, provides MAL-BIND-K-CT security and LEAK-BIND-K-PK security, as demonstrated in . Therefore this concrete instance provides MAL-BIND-K-PK and MAL-BIND-K-CT security. This implies via that this instance also satisfies

• MAL-BIND-K,CT-PK
• MAL-BIND-K,PK-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K-CT
• LEAK-BIND-K,CT-PK
• LEAK-BIND-K,PK-CT
• HON-BIND-K-PK
• HON-BIND-K-CT
• HON-BIND-K,CT-PK
• HON-BIND-K,PK-CT

Random Scalar Generation Two popular algorithms for generating a random integer uniformly distributed in the range [0, G.Order() -1] are as follows:

Rejection Sampling Generate a random byte array with Ns bytes, and attempt to map to a Scalar by calling DeserializeScalar in constant time. If it succeeds, return the result. If it fails, try again with another random byte array, until the procedure succeeds. Failure to implement DeserializeScalar in constant time can leak information about the underlying corresponding Scalar. As an optimization, if the group order is very close to a power of 2, it is acceptable to omit the rejection test completely. In particular, if the group order is p, and there is an integer b such that |p - 2^b| is less than 2^(b/2), then RandomScalar can simply return a uniformly random integer of at most b bits.

Wide Reduction Generate a random byte array with l = ceil(((3 * ceil(log2(G.Order()))) / 2) / 8) bytes, and interpret it as an integer; reduce the integer modulo G.Order() and return the result. See for the underlying derivation of l.

Security Considerations Informally, these hybrid KEMs are secure if the KDF is secure, and either the elliptic curve is secure, or the post-quantum KEM is secure: this is the 'hybrid' property. More precisely for the concrete instantiations in this document, if SHA3-256, SHA3-512, and SHAKE-256 may be modelled as a random oracle, then the IND-CCA security of QSF constructions is bounded by the IND-CCA security of ML-KEM, and the gap-CDH security of secp256n1, see .

Fixed-length Variable-length secrets are generally dangerous. In particular, using key material of variable length and processing it using hash functions may result in a timing side channel. In broad terms, when the secret is longer, the hash function may need to process more blocks internally. In some unfortunate circumstances, this has led to timing attacks, e.g. the Lucky Thirteen and Raccoon attacks. Furthermore, identified a risk of using variable-length secrets when the hash function used in the key derivation function is no longer collision-resistant. If concatenation were to be used with values that are not fixed-length, a length prefix or other unambiguous encoding would need to be used to ensure that the composition of the two values is injective and requires a mechanism different from that specified in this document. Therefore, this specification MUST only be used with algorithms which have fixed-length shared secrets (after the variant has been fixed by the algorithm identifier in the NamedGroup negotiation in Section 3.1).

Out of Scope Considerations that were considered and not included in these designs:

More than two component KEMs Design team decided to restrict the space to only two components, a traditional and a post-quantum KEM.

Parameterized output length Not analyzed as part of any security proofs in the literature, and a complicatation deemed unnecessary.

Protocol-specific labels / info The concrete instantiations have specific labels, protocol-specific information is out of scope.

Other Component Primitives There is demand for other hybrid variants that either use different primitives (RSA, NTRU, Classic McEliece, FrodoKEM), parameters, or that use a combiner optimized for a specific use case. Other use cases could be covered in subsequent documents and not included here.

IANA Considerations

HPKE TODO

References Normative References National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.) In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document provides recommendations for the implementation of public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm, covering cryptographic primitives, encryption schemes, signature schemes with appendix, and ASN.1 syntax for representing keys and for identifying the schemes. This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. By publishing this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF. This document also obsoletes RFC 3447. This memo specifies two elliptic curves over prime fields that offer a high level of practical security in cryptographic applications, including Transport Layer Security (TLS). These curves are intended to operate at the ~128-bit and ~224-bit security level, respectively, and are generated deterministically based on a list of required properties. This document specifies a number of algorithms for encoding or hashing an arbitrary string to a point on an elliptic curve. This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF. Informative References ANS CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.) UK National Cyber Security Centre One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that incorporate both post-quantum and traditional asymmetric algorithms. This document defines terminology for such schemes. It is intended to be used as a reference and, hopefully, to ensure consistency and clarity across different protocols, standards, and organisations. n.d. n.d. This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This memo specifies two elliptic curves over prime fields that offer a high level of practical security in cryptographic applications, including Transport Layer Security (TLS). These curves are intended to operate at the ~128-bit and ~224-bit security level, respectively, and are generated deterministically based on a list of required properties.

Acknowledgments TODO acknowledge.